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Abstract
The early development of conflicting theories about the microscopic
mechanism of High Temperature Superconductivity is described. The
biographical roots of this diversity are stressed, as well as its subjec-
tive/objective roots. This study of a specific case of knowledge about a
specific fact of nature allows to discuss the subjective and objective roots
of scientific pluralism. Relativism, the Duhem-Quine thesis on the under-
determination of theory by facts, are discussed from the stand point of the
materialist view on the dialectics of knowledge and nature. Developments
of dialectic materialism seem to be suggested by this study.
1 Introduction
This paper is interested in discussing a current puzzling situation in contem-
porary physics: a plurality of conflicting theories have emerged very rapidly
upon the discovery, in 1986, of High Temperature Superconductivity ( hereafter
HTS). Understanding how, why, and if HTS is a new phenomenon has led to a
variety of theoretical proposals, which have not stopped since then to confront
each other.
My main point of view here is that of dialectic materialism, a point of view
which is rejected with various nuances of outrage or contempt by a large cur-
rent of analytic philosophers nowadays. In fact, I wish to point out that, in my
view, the battle about HTS suggests that qualitative enrichments of dialectics
are needed : in general the subjective/objective approach of dialectical mate-
rialism to the connection between knowledge and reality relies on the analysis
of possible coexistence and even identity of bipolar contraries within the thing:
cause and effect, quality and quantity, capital and work, corpuscular and wave
like behaviour, kinetic energy vs potential energy, etc.. What the study of HTS
suggests, as I will argue, is that a multipolar set of contradictions emerges from
experiments and theories, a suggestion which might help overcome the present
situation in HTS of conflicting theories which ignore or fiercely fight each others.
Given the degree of present day lack of interest for, or misconceptions about
dialectical materialism among many philosophers of science, I deem it necessary
to devote to this topic a whole section (section 2), before entering the topic
of HTS proper, in the hope that some readers will admit reading the paper to
the end to judge its value in an objective (however also necessarily subjective)
way. That section, for want of space, is admittedly elementary, schematic and
incomplete. I am inspired by Lucien Sève’s point of view, as developed (in
French) in a series of recent books [1]. The interested reader should rely on those
works for a detailed and more convincing defence of the dialectical materialist
point of view.
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Section 3 is a brief account of contemporary discussions on scientific plural-
ism.
Section 4 sets the stage of HTS: how it started in 1986, why it was a total
surprise, what are the major features which are agreed upon by most physicists
as far as a vast class of HTS materials is concerned; the contrast with the previ-
ously known and seemingly well understood phenomenon of superconductivity
since 1911 is underlined.
Section 5 is an outline of the stunning development of contemporary contro-
versies, since 1986, among physicists about the theory of HTS. This outline, as
honest as I have tried to write it down, is necessarily both subjective and objec-
tive. This is because I have been personally involved in the HTS research, a fact
which necessarily gives me both a somewhat learned but subjective/objective
point of view. Given the incredible volume of experimental and theoretical
publications (probably more than hundred thousands in tens or hundreds of
scientific journals), no one at this stage is able to give a complete balanced
account of HTS. This suggests that a collective effort of physicists and philoso-
phers of all trends, to analyze the HTS phenomenon from a philosophical point
of view, would be necessary and welcome. Knowledge of superconductivity,
and especially about HTS, among philosophers of physics is, unfortunately, not
as general as it should be; this paper hopes to stimulate bridging this gap in
philosophical discussions.
That section is somewhat technical; it requires some elementary knowledge of
condensed matter physics. I hope it remains nevertheless useful for the readers
less familiar with this area of physics.
Section 6 is devoted to a recurrent theme in epistemological discussions: the
Duhem-Quine thesis on the “underdetermination of theory by the facts”. HTS
may seem to be a good example of this thesis, which is at the center of neo-
kantian positions, following which the thing in itself (das Ding in sich) escapes
for ever a complete knowledge. I argue in that section that this thesis does not
have universal value and cannot be the final word about HTS.
2 On the limits of the no-contradiction principle
This section is devoted to the question of the “contradiction within objects of
nature” which I have mentionned in the introduction. There is currently a
large sector among philosophers and in particular philosophers of science who
consider the “no contradiction principle” established by Aristotle has such a
validity that any mention of coexistence and - worse, identity - of contraries
in objects of nature is immediately rejected by many, with no hesitation or
discussion. Some [2] admit contradictions within social objects, such as the
capital/work antagonism. However admitting contradictions within nature is
rejected. This last position neglects the fact that humans, and their society,
are ultimately also objects of nature, except from a spiritualist or idealist point
of view. If contradictions within a material object of nature such as human
society is admitted, there is no rational argument to ban them within other
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objects of nature. Even though there are very good reasons for holding to the
no-contradiction principle, there are also good reasons to reconsider it, and its
limits of validity, in view of some arguments I discuss now.
The history of dialectical thinking is about three thousand years old [1].That
some truth may be expressed in a contradiction is at the heart of the most
ancient philosophies in China, India, Greece, from Lao-tseu to Heraklite 1. This
was radically dismissed by Aristotle 2, in the name of a logic he established [3].
Dialectical thinking was banished in the western world as detrimental to social
order, also as making communication impossible.
A crucial point is that the no-contradiction principle is based on an onto-
logical postulate, i.e. the invariance of the essence. Masked by the universal
sensible change in our sublunar world, the latter is nevertheless the ultimate
truth of the being[1, 3].
Then Kant, at the time of the French Revolution [4] finds out that the
century old efforts of metaphysics results in fundamental and unsolvable con-
tradictions, which he dubbed antinomies. The latter, says Kant, are a sign of a
fundamental incapacity of our understanding.
Then Hegel [5] takes a bold new stand: if all quest for truth inevitably results
in a contradiction, then contradiction is the truth!
For Hegel, dialectics is not illogical, it is logic developed beyond the limits
of aristotelian logic. The no-contradiction principle appears to be relevant for
the invariant, the inert thing, but it is in great difficulty to think connections
and processes, as illustrated by the problems posed since ancient times by the
simple motion of an arrow...Hegel’s ideas caused enormous interest in Europe
in the 19th century, as well as fierce opposition, in particular by the catholic
church, for which Hegel is a pantheist, or worse, an atheist3. The 2nd Em-
pire and Napoleon the 3rd banish Hegel’s ideas from Academia. In turn the
working class movement and the rise of socialist thinking triggered a revival
of hegelian studies. Marx [6] had adopted hegelian dialectics, but rejects the
idealist hegelian position following which the Idea, the Concept, precede reality;
for him, dialectics appears in the theory of knowledge as a result of dialectics
in the objective world. Engels [7] develops dialectical materialism, formulates
laws thereof; at first dialectics is for him objective inasmuch as it is imposed by
reality to our subjective logic; later he reaches a disputable position: dialectical
materialism becomes, in a pure ontological way the science of the general laws
of motion of the external world as well as those of human thought[8]: this thesis
dismisses the essential epistemic aspect of dialectics and eventually opens the
way to the catastrophic version of stalinist dogmatism.
After the defeat of nazism, dialectical materialism became an important
1Example from Heraklite: “ It is impossible to bathe twice in the same river”
2Aristotle : “the same cannot belong and simultaneously not belong to the same simul-
taneously and under the same connexion”(ontology); “contradictory statements cannot be
simultaneously true” (logic); “nobody can believe that the same could be simultaneously be
and not be”(psychology)
3I cannot review here those developments, for want of space. Interested readers are invited
to read, for example, the recent book by Séve (chapter IV) [1].
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philosophical current. Most serious philosophers in Europe, Asia and elsewhere
adopted it, in one version or another. This success led to its demise. It suffered
a severe blow when it was used as official state philosophy in the USSR. Much
to the contrary, nothing, in the founding philosophical writings [6, 7, 9] allowed
to justify turning them into an official State philosophy. This produced such
catastrophies as the State support for Lyssenko’s theories, based on the notion
that genetics was a bourgeois science, while lamarckian concepts were defined
at the government level as correct from the point of view of a caricature of
dialectical materialism. It is understandable that such nonsense in the name of
a philosophical principle turned the latter into a questionable construction in
the eyes of many.
Dialectic materialism itself is an open system, which has no lesson to teach
beforehand about specific objects of knowledge, and insists [7] on taking into
account all lessons taught by the advancement of science. This is precisely my
outlook in this paper: the story of High Temperature Superconductivity may
indicate that dialectical thinking about nature needs some conceptual develop-
ment.
It is perhaps time for a serious critical assessment of this philosophical cur-
rent and of its principles. The possibility of general theoretical statements about
the empirical world is not a negligible question.
Materialism gives a clear answer to the "‘gnoseological problem of the rela-
tionship between thought and existence, between sense-data and the world...Matter
is that which, acting on our senses, produces sensations.” This was written in
1908 by Lenin [9]. It may look too simple when technology (such as that used
in quantum physics experiments) is intercalated between matter (for example
the electrons in the two slit experiment and the screens on which we read their
impact). Technology or not, matter is the external source of our sensations. So
much for materialism. Dialectical materialism adds a fundamental aspect i.e.
that theories reflect the existence of contraries which coexist and compete with
each other within things in Nature. Depending on which dominates the compe-
tition (contradiction) under what conditions, the causal chains originating from
the thing and causing phenomena will take different forms, which are reflected
in theories. Epistemics and ontology are intimately intertwined.
Consider an example of how formal logic and dialectical logic complete and
enrich each other: that of cause and effect. A moving billiard ball 1 hits a
motionless billiard ball 2 which is thus set in motion. The motion of 1 is the
cause for the motion of 2, which is the effect. Cause and effect are two contraries
of a logic of identity: their meaning is clear, the relation is uni-directional:
there seems to have no room left for contradiction. However, if the collision has
caused the motion of 2, due to that of 1, the trajectory, energy and velocity
of 1 have also been changed; to the initial causal relationship wherein 1 is a
cause for 2 is added necessarily an inverse causal effect wherein 2 becomes a
cause for the motion of 1. The uni-directional causal relation we had first is
turned immediately in a reciprocal relation: a cause leading to a consequence is
in turn affected by the consequence turned into a cause itself. Can’t we see here
an example of unity of contraries? The classical logician will deny it, observing
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that there is no contradiction, but interaction: coincidence of two causal actions
which remain distinct causal ones. However, how can we distinguish within the
collision the causal action of 1 on 2 and that of 2 on 1?
Another example is given by Aristotle’s fundamental categories such as qual-
ity and quantity. In the classical logic, those two categories are clearly distinct
and form a couple of well identified contraries. But there are hosts of empirical
evidence that there is no such dichotomy : quantity transforms into quality
almost universally.
2.1 Dialectics of knowledge, dialectics of nature, dialecti-
cal materialism
A central philosophical problem is that of the relationship between thought and
being. Following Sève [48] ...this defines a central structure of the network of
philosophical categories. The relationship between being and thought is indeed
dedoubled in the thought about the being, and the being of the thought, i.e. in
the categories of the objective reality reflected by thought, and those of the sub-
jective reflection of the being. This relationship is not abstractly motionless, it
is a process, which is itself a double one: the motion of the being and the motion
of thought. From the latter, four groups of categories emerge:
• (thought of) the being in motion: materialist outlook on the world,
• (being of) the thought in motion: materialist outlook on knowledge,
• (thought of) the motion of the being: objective dialectics,
• (being of) the motion of thought: subjective dialectics
Matter, contradictions, reflection, concreteness: such are the central categories
of those four groups : the concrete reflection in thought of the contradictions
of matter : such is the essence of the relationship of thought to being. But it
is crucial not to forget the dimension of the practice; as emphasized by Engels,
“the practical activity of man in nature – not only nature as such – is the most
essential cause, the most direct one, of human thought”. Note than ore than
hundred years after Marx, Hacking [14] rediscovers practice as a criterion of
reality, without, nevertheless, adopting a materialist view of reality: “realism”
does not explicitly bans God from the possible real entities.
Sève [1] writes also: ...the two poles of the cognitive process, the subjective
and the objective must be recognized not only as opposite ones, but as identical:
the objective part is subjective – and here the very meaning of the scientific
endeavour seems to be lost – but simultaneously the conditions and limits under
which the subjective part is objective become determinable.
Popper [10] in his book Objective Knowledge considers the world of “objective
contents of thought”, but considers that contradictions have to be eliminated.
Although is thesis is an evolutionary approach, he misses the richness of the
four poles of categories mentionned above, and dismisses the value of Hegel’s
philosophy.
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What will be described below about HTS illustrates the relevance of the four
points above.
3 Scientific pluralism
What is at stake in a number of discussions about conflicting theories may be
interpreted as the question of “scientific pluralism": can it be that two or more
conflicting theories account for the same phenomena, or account for the causal
powers of the same objective real entities?
Dickson [11] defines scientific pluralism as "‘...the existence or toleration of
a diversity of theories, interpretations, or methodologies within science"’.
Following Hillary Putnam [12], who discusses how things (e.g. electrons) are
named, and how theories evolve, all sorts of incompatible accounts of the thing
appear, all of which agree in describing various causal powers which may be
employed while acting on nature.
Cartwright [13] emphasizes that in several branches of quantum mechanics,
searchers may use a number of different models of the same phenomena. They
can be mutually inconsistent, and none is the whole truth.
Dickson asks: "‘How can one be a pluralist about science while respecting
the (approximate) validity of our best scientific theories?"’ In the course of his
paper, he defends his own admission that as far as quantum mechanics is con-
cerned, pluralism is justified and acknowledges the existence, and toleration of a
diversity of contradictory theories. He writes: I shall address the most obvious
and serious objection to such a view...namely, that it places the scientifically
minded person in the intolerable position of explicitly endorsing contradictions
within science (as a matter of principle and not merely as a pragmatic matter).
To do so is to reject the scientific enterprise.
The authors in references [11, 12, 13, 14] admit that there might be pluralism
in theories, in various guises. But admitting ontological contradictions within
the thing seems to all authors, except perhaps Putnam, to be prohibited and
intolerable. All adhere to the no-contradiction principle as an unquestionable
one.
A straightforward way out of the problem of scientific pluralism is to adopt
one version or another of relativism. Following Kuhn[15] in The Structure of Sci-
entific Revolutions, “scientific theories are beliefs shared by groups of persons”4.
If such is the case, if theories are merely social constructions, as other authors
contend [16, 17], contradictions between theories and battles between theorists
can be accounted for by social, cultural, historical differences between “groups
of persons”: they do not signal anything about ontological contradictions.
Dickson describes various sorts of pluralisms (it seems one may define 27
types). What I have been defending in a previous paper [18] is that contra-
dictions in epistemics may reflect disagreements between erroneous vs correct
theories –admittedly a rather trivial sort of pluralism – , etc., but may also
4Kuhn himself has been critical on the relativistic interpretation of his views.
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reflect ontological contradictions. As discussed in the previous section the aris-
totelian prohibition has its domain of validity, and its limits of validity. One
has to face the possibility that accepting contradictions in nature is a way to
save the scientific enterprise when science is pluralist.
I do not agree with most things Dickson says about quantum mechanics5.
I stress here that he, a philosopher convinced of the aristotelian prohibition of
contradictions, is constrained to admit them as a true feature of theory.
Following section 2, the scientific endeavour is itself rich with contradictions:
it is a social process, through which individuals and groups confront their sub-
jective/objective views, while theorists are increasingly separated from exper-
imentalists; the latter use increasingly sophisticated instruments which access
increasingly varied properties of matter, or phenomena, with increasing accu-
racy in all manners of measurements. If one accepts that the evolution of matter
is dominated by the struggle of contraries which coexist within the thing, the
emergence of a true theory is almost necessarily a socially contradictory process:
scientific pluralism has to be a fairly general stage of science, leading in time
to more complete theories which overcome the previous controversies in which
single physicists, or groups, had taken part, until errors have been eliminated,
and ontological contradictions are properly taken into account as part of reality.
My main disagreement with all neo-kantian philosophers quoted above is
that scientific pluralism is an almost unavoidable but transient feature of the
scientific development. For Newton, light is corpuscular. For Fresnel, it is
a wave. It takes two centuries of controversies and seemingly contradictory
experimental results to understand that those contradictions in epistemics reflect
the quantum mechanical behaviour of microscopic systems. Both views retained
a fundamental part of the truth, while the aristotelian no-contradiction principle
implied that one or the other was wrong.
This particular example has universal value: contradictions in epistemics
may well reflect, at times, ontological contradictions. Phenomenal manifesta-
tions of the same object of nature differ when one pole of an ontological contra-
diction dominates, or the reverse. The conditions for one pole to dominate on
the other depend on the various constraints exerted by the environment, such
as pressure, temperature, magnetic field intensity, etc.. Analyzing fully the con-
tradictions within the thing is the way to reach scientific truth. Is this notion of
interest in the problem of High Temperature Superconductivity? This question
is central to this paper.
4 High Temperature Superconductivity
The history, physics and theory of Superconductivity are rich with surprises,
suspense, and, in the last 30 years, with fierce scientific battles among theorists
and experimental groups. Never before in the history of science have so many
papers been published about a specific topic with no agreement in sight about
5Such as stating that quantum mechanics has no dynamics. I cannot enter in details here
about these disagreements.
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the theoretical understanding of the microscopic mechanism of what appeared
as a coup de théâtre in 1986: the astonishing discovery by an aging and ob-
scure scientist and his assistant6 of superconductivity, at temperatures much
higher than ever reached before for this phenomenon, in compounds where no
educated physicist, except perhaps one or two7, would ever had bet one cent on
its appearance [20].
As I had started writing this paper, I stumbled upon a review article by a
physicist on the the same topic [21]. The author writes:
One cannot write the history of a war when it is still raging and
this is certainly applying to the task we are facing dealing with the
theory of superconductivity in the post BCS era 8. The BCS the-
ory was of course a monumental achievement that deserves to be
counted among the greatest triumphs in physics of the twentieth cen-
tury. With the discovery of high-Tc superconductivity in the cuprates
in 1986 a consensus emerged immediately that something else was
at work than the classic (i.e. phonon driven) BCS mechanism.
Superconductivity first erupted in the world of scientific knowledge in 1911 –
long before what is the topic of this paper – as a consequence of a scientific and
technological advance. Kammerlingh Onnes [22], in 1908, managed to liquidify
Helium at the incredibly – at the time – low temperature of about 4 degrees
Kelvin 9. This allowed to explore the properties of matter within new, ex-
tended ranges of parameters. With this achievement, Kammerlingh Onnes and
his collaborators could endeavour to study the behaviour of condensed matter
at hitherto unexplored low temperatures. Physics at the time was very much
geared to exploring properties of metals and alloys, because of fundamental rea-
sons, and also because of the industrial interest in such bodies, in particular
because of their electrical and thermal conducting properties. It was already
known that down to liquid nitrogen temperatures (around 70 degrees K) all
metallic resistivities were decreasing functions of temperature. Various laws de-
scribing this decrease had been observed in various metals. When the laboratory
in Leyden studied the resistive behaviour of Mercury (noted Hg), a mysterious
abrupt drop in resistivity was observed at 4 degres K, and the metal seemed to
become a perfect conductor! Various metals were found then to exhibit a similar
behaviour, at the so called “critical temperatures” Tc which are characteristic
of each pure metal. It took twenty more years to realize that this phenomenon
was not simply a perfect conductivity, but a conductivity of a special type: it
expels the magnetic field [23] from the volume of the metal10. This is not what
would happen in a normal metal if its resistivity became zero11.
6Both were jointly awarded a Nobel Prize...
7See however reference [19]
8The BCS theory was the recognized theory for the vast majority of superconductors known
before 1986
9Nowadays there are ways to reach temperatures of a millionth of a degree...
10The magnetic field is expelled at sufficiently low fields; the story is more complicated
when the magnetic field intensity is larger than a so-called critical field called Hc1
11for example in perfectly pure metal.
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The long and difficult quest for a theoretical understanding for this phe-
nomenon is a fascinating story in itself, but it is not the topic of this paper.
A major theoretical advance (quoted above as the BCS theory) was achieved
by Bardeen Cooper and Schrieffer [24] in 1958 when they published a revolu-
tionary theory: superconductivity was due to a breakdown of the normal metal
electronic structure: instead of behaving as almost independent particles gov-
erned by Fermi statistics, electrons (which have half integer spin and therefore
are fermions) interact with lattice vibrations (called phonons) of the metallic
crystal. The latter may be viewed as sort of glue which dominates the repulsive
Coulomb interaction between electrons at low enough temperatures (inciden-
tally, attractive vs repulsive interactions are yet another example of contradic-
tion within the same thing). As a result electrons become associated in pairs,
which are called singlets, have zero spin, and are bosons. Identical bosons had
been shown by Bose and Einstein to condense in a superfluid state a low enough
temperature. A superfluid state of charged particles is a superconducting state.
Ten years of intense exploitation of the BCS theoretical advance followed, some-
what along the lines of what Kuhn called normal science [15]. New theoretical
entities became familiar terms: order parameter, phase coherence, penetration
depth, vortex phase, etc.. The order parameter – in the case of BCS supercon-
ductivity a complex number – characterizes the new superconducting quality:
it starts from zero at the superconducting critical temperature when the tem-
perature decreases, and its intensity grows up to a maximum at zero temper-
ature, with thermal variation laws which were determined experimentally and
explained theoretically within the BCS theory. Magnetic fields, and magnetism
at large, were well identified as detrimental to (contradictory with) supercon-
ductivity and as a cause for its destruction. New devices appeared [25], based
on quantum properties of the superconducting state in the presence of magnetic
fields. They are now standard tools for scientific investigation, or industrial and
medical applications.
Some years around 1970, it appeared to the overwhelming majority of physi-
cists and science managers – public or private – that the (scientific) gold rush to
superconductivity had exhausted its scientific novelty deposits. Science leaders
who had been prominent in developing the field dropped it as a research pro-
gram altogether, more or less abruptly, as miners abandon a gold mine when its
yield becomes negligible. Scientific teams were disbanded12 and geared to other
fields: everything about superconductivity was known. The BCS theory was
universally held as true. It had become an obsolete field [26]. The loss of inter-
est was also due to the quite commonly shared view among physicists that the
highest possible superconductivity temperature on the planet earth would never
exceed 25 K by more than a few degrees. This rule, which had been formulated
empirically by a well known experimentalist meant that superconductors would
remain for ever a laboratory phenomenon, with almost no industrial application.
Only a handful of searchers, mostly aging and obscure ones, kept trying to
12In Japan, a small team of scientists was instructed by the science ministry to keep watch-
ing the physics reviews in case some improbable unforeseen novelty appeared in the field of
superconductivity.
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find ways of realizing higher superconductivity temperatures. A major industrial
and environmental interest, to this day, is to find ways of storing electricity in a
cheap way: superconducting currents, circulating in a supercondcting ring, do
not suffer the costly energy losses due to Ohm’s law for usual electric currents:
they last –in principle – for ever. Finding ways of storing electrical energy as
chemical energy is stored in coal, oil, or...dynamite, is a long lasting industrial
dream. If this storage process requires prohibitive costs to cool down conductors
to such temperatures as 20 K, the costs exceed the benefits.
When High Temperature Superconductivity (hereafter HTS) was discovered,
this dream suddenly seemed to come true. Whole teams of physicists rushed
to study, understand and improve the totally new and unexpected material –
chemically doped copper oxides – which exhibits HTS.
Figure 1 shows a schematic view of the chemistry and structure of a typical
HTS material. One should add to Figure 1 that by altering the stoechiometry of
various chemical components, such as Oxygen, or substituting a small concen-
tration of La atom by Sr atoms, or some other chemical manipulation, one can
suppress an equivalent concentration of electrons – i.e. inject “holes”–. In fact
the stoechiometric compound (no hole) is an antiferromagnetic (AF) insulator,
which becomes superconducting with increasing superconducting temperature
upon increasing the concentration of holes.
Very quickly the family of doped copper oxides became quite large; later
on new families were discovered, such as Fe pnictides. As of today, the largest
known superconductivity temperature is that of a Bismuth Copper oxide com-
pound and is around 150 K, i.e. some 80 K larger than that for liquidify Nitro-
gen.
Thirty years after HTS was discovered, its fundamental mechanism is still
the object of passionate debates among physicists.
The aim of this paper is to explore some philosophical lessons taught and
questions raised by the HTS story until now. Putting aside the ontological
question about the reality of HTS, which is sufficiently established by all con-
verging tens of thousands of experiments and industrial applications, the main
discussions will be about:
• the subjective roots of this diversity;
• the objective (ontological) roots of this diversity;
• the Duhem-Quine thesis about the “under determination of theory by ex-
periments” [27, 28]. Is the war mentionned above doomed to last forever?
• the lessons taught by this story from the point of view of the dialectics of
knowledge and/or that of nature [1, 18].
11
Figure 1: This figure exhibits the atomic structure of a typical HT Superconductor: contrary
to the vast majority of (lower temperature) BCS superconductors, which have a much simpler
chemical structure and a much simpler (usually cubic) crystallographic one (in one guise or
another)), this crystal is formed by parallel sheets of Cu-O (Copper oxide) planes. The “red”
atoms here are oxygen atoms, the “blue” ones are Cu (Copper)atoms; two Cu-O planes are
separated by “brown” atoms (such as Ytrium or Lanthanum while “green” atoms are divalent
metals such as Ca or Ba. A large family of HT Superconductors exhibits the common feature
of weakly coupled Cu-O planes which have a basic square elementary cell. The occurrence
of linear arrays of Oxygen chains between copper planes is specific to the particular chemical
(YBaCuO) shown above. I am indebted to Julien Bobroff for providing me with the file for
this figure.
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5 Historical development of different theories of
HTS
5.1 Agreements and disagreements: subjective contradic-
tions
• Agreements.
As soon as the experimental paper on the new HTS appeared, a flurry
of theoretical differences among the various theories of the phenomenon
appeared, on a background of universal theoretical agreement. The agree-
ment was, with no exception known to me, that any theory had to account
for the instability of the normal electronic system on the basis of forma-
tion of bosonic electron pairs. The HTS displays zero resistance and the
Meissner effect; as for BCS superconductors, HTS is a “spontaneous break-
ing of the gauge invariance” of the normal electron system. This is the
common background for the different theories concerning the microscopic
mechanism of HTS.
• Disagreements.
Disagreements had their roots in the evaluation by the various schools
–should I say chapels? – of the specific reason why the new material was
falsifying the previous wisdom on the formerly known superconducting
BCS material. Some of the disagreements are deduced by inspecting the
figure 1. Depending on which structural property of the new material
is deemed to be at the basis of the new behaviour, different theoretical
proposals will emerge. The specific Copper oxides structural features, as
compared to “ancient” BCS metals are:
1.– contrary to most BCS metals which have cubic symmetry, HT Super-
conductors are organized as stacks of CuO planes –with a square array
of Cu atoms separated by Oxygen – in weak electronic contact with each
other, as these planes are in general separated from each other by a layer
of inert atoms. In fact, differing on the specific HT Superconductor, the
structure may have separated CuO planes, or sandwiches of two or more
CuO planes separated from other sandwiches. HTS are anisotropic crys-
tals with a preferred symmetry axis perpendicular to the CuO planes.
2.–In a CuO plane, since each Cu carries one outer electron available for
conduction, the system of conduction electrons – if repulsive Coulomb
interactions are neglected – should form a two-dimensional (2D) square
Fermi surface occupying half of the available electronic states. This is in
contrast with the 3-dimensional (3D) spherical Fermi Surface considered
by the BCS theory.
3.– The oxide character of the HTS compounds is quite different from the
simple monoatomic structure of most BCS superconductors: the chemical
structure is qualitatively more complex.
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4.– An astonishing feature of the CuO HTS is that the isolated CuO
plane is theoretically a textbook example of an AF insulator: each Cu
carries an electron bound to this atom. Two electrons spins on neigh-
bouring Cu atoms are coupled 13 antiferromagnetically, which means that
the electronic lattice, at zero temperature should be a regular Néel array
of localized spins with alternating spin direction from atom to atom, re-
sulting in a so-called “Mott insulator”. The latter is based on the notion
that Coulomb interactions are so strong between electrons that they are
constrained to stay apart from one another and stay localized each on its
Cu atom. The AF order results from a small energy gain when neighbour-
ing spins are antiparallel. This is in contrast with item 2 above, where
Coulomb interactions are assumed to be negligible, so that electronic wave
functions spread over the whole CuO plane, turning the crystal with one
electron per atomic cell in a good metal. Furthermore, the well established
experimental fact that HTS appears as emerging upon doping a magnetic
material was at variance with the BCS wisdom that magnetism destroys
superconductivity.
5.– In addition doping the insulating crystal to turn it into a HTS in-
evitably introduces disorder in the lattice.
5.2 The subjective/objective biographical roots of scien-
tific pluralism in the history of HTS.
Below, I list some of the main conflicting theoretical proposals which have been
formulated very early on, and how each has been rooted in the past scientific
activity of its champions. They are ordered in increasing degree of novelty with
respect to the BCS theory. Each item has a paragraph in italics which recalls
its history, as rooted in the scientific biography of its main proponent.
• Friedel. BCS picture with singularity in the density of electronic states
states.
This picture has been developed by Friedel and collaborators, based on
their BCS theory in 1970 for some of the superconductors with the largest
known superconductivity temperature known before 1986 (about 21 K, in
the so-called A15 compounds). A basic assumption of this approach is
that above the superconducting temperature the metallic state is normal
and has a well defined Fermi surface. The interaction energy between
electrons is supposed in this picture to be much smaller than the band
width, and electron-phonon interactions play the same decisive role as in
the BCS theory.
The Friedel proposal in 1970 had been based on the notion that in A15
compounds, the quasi one dimensional structure14 may lead to a large
peak in the electronic density of states at the Fermi level. Within BCS
13by a coupling mechanism known since the fifties called super-exchange.
14A generic property of so called A − 15 crystals such as Nb3Sn or V3Si .
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theory, such a peak produces a larger superconducting temperature than a
lower regular flat density of states.
Friedel and collaborators argued that in CuO planes, such a singularity
arises in the density of states precisely for one electron per lattice cell
in the CuO lattice. Neglecting Coulomb interactions, they adapted their
previous theory to the new material and attributed to phonons, as in the
BCS theory, the role of glue between pairs of electrons. The only new
experimental feature which this proposal takes into account is the crystal
anisotropy, as shown in figure 1.
• Schrieffer. The Spin Bag picture.
Schrieffer [30] developed a theory based on repulsive electron-electron in-
teraction in a large energy band. The starting point is similar to Friedel’s,
namely the existence of a well defined Fermi Surface at temperatures larger
than the superconducting temperature. In certain cases, a geometry of
the Fermi surface (a so-called “nesting property”) each electron spin will
surround itself with a cloud of spin polarization. Schrieffer argued that
under certain conditions, two such clouds could favour the formation of
electronic spin singlets. In other words, he suggested an alternative route
to the superconducting phase: instead of an attraction between electrons
mediated by phonons, as in the standard BCS phenomenon, the attrac-
tive electron-electron interaction is a result of spin fluctuations, which are
themselves the result of repulsive electron-electron interactions.
Some twenty years before, Schrieffer and col. had worked out a spin fluctu-
ation theory to account for the transport and thermal properties of almost
magnetic metals such as Pd and Pd − Ni alloys [31, 32]. This theory
argued that spin fluctuations destroy superconductivity.
On the face of the HTS discovery, a contradictory result was found to be
possible, under conditions not explored previously!
• Schulz. The Renormalization Group with Van Hove singularity.
An original picture was proposed by Schulz [33]. He devised a brilliant
Renormalization Group (hereafter RG) approach to electron-electron in-
teractions in a half filled square lattice. A Van Hove singularity is a sin-
gular property of the density of electronic states when the Fermi Surface
and the boundaries of the Brillouin zone come in contact. This feature
has important consequences. Schulz explored (before Schrieffer) the new
scenario based on repulsive electron-electron interactions. Even though
the starting point of his study is, as in item F and Schrieffer above, that
of weak (compared to the band width energy K) electronic repulsive in-
teractions U , the RG treatment of the many electron-electron interac-
tion processes is based on the recognition that various different symmetry
breaking phases, associated to different electronic processes, are compet-
ing, in the case of a square Fermi surface and Van Hove singularities15,
15Which is the case in a half filled square lattice.
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with one another. Among them a superconducting phase with a novel
order parameter dubbed d-wave is competing with an antiferromagnetic
insulating one. Taking into account a slightly more realistic Fermi surface
(not exactly a square) it was easy to show, using Schulz’ approach, that
the most stable phase could indeed be a d-wave superconducting one [34].
Prior to the discovery of HTS, Schulz had been working on one dimensional
electron systems, where the RG allows to sort out the various (competing)
symmetry breaking ground states. A surprising result of his RG approach,
along the work in ref. [34], is that repulsive electron-electron interactions
may lead to a stable superconducting phase. As for the authors of ref.[34],
they had been working, before the discovery of HTS in 1986 on realistic
Fermi Surfaces in quasi 1-D conductors16.
• Mott. The bipolaron picture.
Mott [35] also attributed HTS to electron-ionic lattice interactions. Fa-
mous for his numerous contributions to physics, he had – among others –
published pioneering studies of transition metal oxides, and of their elec-
tronic states.
In particular he had pointed out, many years earlier, that due to strong
electron lattice interactions in insulating oxides, isolated electron would
deform the lattice by Coulomb attraction between electrons and the ionic
lattice, forming so-called polarons [36]. He then argued that in HTS such
polarons could form pairs (due to a lowering of elastic energy) dubbed
bi-polarons, which are bosons. Bosons then condense to form a supercon-
ducting state.
• Anderson. The Resonating Valence Bond picture. The Mott insulator
parent of HTS.
P. W. Anderson (PWA) [37] proposed a revolutionary “Resonating Valence
Bond” (RVB) theory. His approach took the view, contrary to Friedel,
Schrieffer and Schulz, that Coulomb interactions (of the order of U =
100000K), far exceed, in the CuO plane, the band width energy (of the
order of K = 10000K). His starting point was that the undoped cuprate
was a Mott insulator. He first suggested that in the case of the square
lattice with one electron per site, the ground state could be different from
the expected Néel AF state. PWA instead proposed that neighbouring
spins form singlets, and described a massive entanglement of products of
singlet states “resonating” with each other. At half filling, the ground
state would be a new insulating quantum spin liquid. But if a sufficient
concentration of “holes” (empty states) are injected in the lattice, the
doped system of entangled singlet states becomes superconducting with
a temperature of order of the kinetic energy17. His initial formulation
16Schulz’ pioneering work is not always recognized. Due to his untimely death, Schulz,
unfortunately, was not able to disseminate his results in conferences, meetings, etc..
17This point was quickly corrected[39] to an estimate of the order of K2/4U ≈ 250K.
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predicted a superconducting order parameter of symmetry s, as in the
BCS theory; this was quickly revised in favour of d-wave, for experimental
and theoretical reasons. The d-wave singlet is favoured by strong repulsive
Coulomb interactions, because it has zero amplitude for the two electrons
of the singlet to be simultaneously present on the same site.
The RVB proposal had been first developed by PWA, in 1973 18, years
before the advent of HTS, as an alternative ground state to the Néel in-
sulating (AF) ground state for certain Mott insulators[38]. PWA gave an
example of a “railroad trestle” (a model with two coupled infinite straight
lines with a regular array of spin 1/2 electron and exchange coupling in-
chain and inter-chain). This model provided a proof of the possibility of a
RVB ground state with a lower energy than the conventional Néel one.
His novel intuition in 1986 about the CuO square with doped holes was
that the system of holes embedded in the RVB spin liquid would be super-
conducting. His original prediction of the magnitude of the superconduct-
ing temperature nurtured wild hopes for very high ones. Another novel
feature of this proposal was the separation of spin and charge degrees of
freedom into “spinons” and “holons”, in the RVB state: a spectacular
breakdown of the independent electron picture.
Anderson’s proposal received enthusiastic support by a large fraction of
theorists, because of its novelty and its audacity which seemed to corre-
spond to the novelty of the HTS material, and to that of spectacularly
high superconducting temperatures. Another sizeable part of the theo-
rists’ population, rejected it, precisely because of its novelty and audac-
ity: attributing the new phenomenon to repulsive interactions, while from
1958 to 1986 all superconducting material had been understood on the
basis of attractive (el-phonons) seemed hard to swallow...
• Laughlin. The anyon superconductivity picture.
Within the new paradigm of a superconductivity scenario based on strong
electron-electron repulsions, Laughlin [40] developped the so called “anyon
model of HTS”, also a daring revolutionnary one. He focused also on the
behaviour of electrons confined to a plane. Contrary to Anderson, he did
not take into account the discreteness of the atomic lattice. His main
new idea was that in the HTS phase, a uniform magnetic field would
spontaneously arise and organize electrons in a superfluid liquid similar to
the Fractional Quantum Hall liquid which he had so brilliantly studied in
the early eighties and for which he was to be awarded the Nobel prize. In
terms of audacity and novelty, his work passed that of Anderson.
He used the wisdom acquired in the study of the Quantum Hall Effects
(QHE), three years before the advent of HTS. He showed that a (2D)
gas of anyonic particles had to be superconducting. Anyonic particles can
only exist in 2D and have statistics governed by any phase angle upon
18In the Materials Research Bulletin.
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interchange of two particles, contrary to bosons or fermions, the statistical
angle of which is, respectively 2pi, or pi. Anyons are believed to exist –on
very firm theoretical grounds – in the QHE.
A simple theoretical picture of the spontaneous emergence of a uniform
magnetic field in a 2D lattice of strongly interacting electrons doped with
holes was given in [41] under the name “flux phase”. A major novelty in
Laughlin’s scheme is that HTS might be the simultaneous spontaneous
breaking of both gauge invariance and time reversal symmetries.
The list of theoretical proposals given above is by no means complete, and
is limited to the very early days of the scientific battles that are still developing
today [21]. Qualitatively new viewpoints have emerged later on, which are not
discussed in this paper. The aim of this paper is to reflect on what we can learn
about the connection between thought and reality in the science process from
those few examples. I cannot guarantee here historical rigor, which in this topic,
as mentionned above, cannot be achieved by a single author. All I can say is
that I have tried to be as truthful as I could.
6 Underdetermination of theory by facts?
At first sight, what I have sketched above seems to support the Duhem/Quine
thesis on the underdetermination of theory by facts [27, 28]. All schemes listed
above claim more or less to account for the same phenomena of HTS, on the
basis of different hypothesis.
As pointed out above, the differences between the theories of the microscopic
mechanisms of HTS have developed on the basis of universally accepted views,
together with different ones on the relevant parameters for the cuprates. Within
the various items I have listed above, there are classes with basic differences,
listed below, along with some overlap between those.
• The band picture scheme.
One class of proposals ( Friedel, Schrieffer, and Schulz for example) are
based on the idea of the domination of kinetic energy K over electronic
interactions U . This is noted K >> U and is the so called band model,
which assumes the band theory of metals to be the correct starting point.
• The electron-phonon scheme.
A sub class of the previous one ( Friedel) is based on the BCS model of
electron-phonon interactions, and neglects electron-electron interactions;
i.e. Uel−ph > Uel−el. Although I have only quoted Friedel in this context,
a large body of theoretical work continues along that line.
• The doped Mott insulator scheme.
Items Schrieffer and Schulz represent another sub-class, which takes the
view that K >> Uel−el >> Uel−ph. Schrieffer and Schulz differ in that
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Schulz focuses on the Van Hove singularity. The latter is unavoidable for
a half filled square lattice; Schulz seems to be the rigorous way to treat the
Schrieffer “spin bag” idea, in the case of a square Fermi Surface touching
the Brillouin zone.
• The Mott insulator scheme.
Another large class of theories is based on the notion that the undoped
ground state of the CuO planes is a “Mott insulator”, i.e. one where
Uel−el >> K >> Uel−ph. This is represented by items Anderson, Mott,
Laughlin above.
• Class Mott is simultaneous one that admits Uel−el > K and that Uel−ph
plays a decisive role in the formation of singlets (bi-polarons).
• Items Friedel, Schrieffer, Schulz contain the notion of a Fermi Surface in
the normal (i.e. metallic) doped phase. Item M does not, since it relies on
bosons which have no Fermi Surface19. The existence of a Fermi surface
is now an established experimental fact.
In agreement with experimental data, all theories share the view that HTS
arises when the CuO planes are doped with holes20.
An obvious lesson is that the development of theory is based on a choice
of the relevant competing types of energy which dominate the HTS instability.
This is, in my view, deeply rooted in the physicists’ culture which teaches to
analyse nature in most cases, in terms of competing energies, (i.e. ontological
contradictions in the dialectical materialist sense) as discussed in [18].
So is it relevant to appeal to the Duhem/Quine thesis as far as HTS is con-
cerned? In spite of appearances, I do not believe that; if at present there is
underdetermination of theory by the facts, this cannot be more than a tempo-
rary state of affairs. The Duhem/Quine thesis expresses a true fact...which has
quite generally only a temporrary relevance, not a long lasting one. Sooner or
later, scientific and/or technological progress allows to overcome this underde-
termination. It took more than fifty years to establish the universally accepted
successful theory for low temperature superconductors. For one thing there are
numerous examples of phenomena the theory of which is undisputed, confirmed
by numerous experiments and verified predictions. For another, HTS erupted
only thirty years ago, and no one may say that no universally accepted theory
of HTS can ever be reached in the future. Some of the theories listed above have
been discarded on the basis of experiments, as discussed below. Others have
had partial confirmation, but need better foundations and more experimental
specific proof. Why should mankind be banned for ever from a completely sat-
ifactory theory of HTS? In a motionless world where the essence of things is
19An interesting document which describes a partial state of affairs in the HTS battles in
1998 is listed in ref. [43].
20Inter CuO layer coupling was considered later by PWA, then abandoned, due to a crucial
experiment.
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eternal, the Duhem/Quine thesis may hold; not in our real historically evolving
world.
What I have described in the last sections 5, and 5.2 seems to be a case
study of what is discussed in section 2.1. Starting with the thought (theoretical
activity) of various authors about the evolution (motion) of the electronic system
in cuprates, from a materialist point of view, we oberve the contradictions of the
evolving human thought about HTS. The thought (theories) about the objective
transformation of matter (emergence of HTS from non superconducting Copper
oxides) exhibits the subjectivity of the motion of thought: each theoretical item
in section 5.2 is narrowly linked with the specific scientific biography of its
proponents. Each founder of an item listed in section 5.2 acts both objectively
and subjectively while picking subjectively from the material represented in
figure 4 such objective features as connect to what he or she had successfully
explained theoretically years before about an object, which, although different,
also exhibits features similar to those of HTS materials.
Another objective/subjective contradictory thought process is the HTS bat-
tle itself, which is waged through the scientific press and the various social forms
(conferences, etc.) through which physicists – theorists and experimentalists –
confront their views and their results, propose crucial experiments.
An increasing tendency in this area is to form groups of searchers convinced
of the validity of a specific scheme, and to ignore contributions – both theo-
retical and experimental ones – which do not explicitly support it. Interna-
tional meetings are sometimes organized by groups who do not invite contra-
dictors...This might be the topic of a sociological study of the developpment of
individual/social contradictions in the search for truth in contemporary physics.
7 Relativism?
Should this lead to a relativistic attitude? Are theories, after all, as Kuhn wrote
[15], beliefs shared by groups of persons? Obviously, if we consider the devel-
opment of HTS theory from the start, this state of affairs reflects at least an
appearance of truth. There are two objections to this : on one hand, it is a
static statement which denies scientific evolution [10]. On the oher hand, some
of the initial theories have been discarded quickly, because some of their cru-
cial predictions have been falsified by experiments. Laughlin’s theory on HTS
ref.[40, 41] has failed in its initial form because of a crucial experiment: the
predicted magnitudes of magnetic fields inside the material have not been ob-
served. Similarly, the bi-polaron theory has been discarded by most, if not all,
theorists. The initial prediction, both by Friedel’s and Anderson’s initial pro-
posals, that the order parameter in HTS would have spherical “s” symmetry,
has been quickly corrected : the evidence that the order parameter in CuO HTS
has “d” symmetry is overwhelming. The latter – contrary with the situation in
BCS supersonductores – is unavoidable in case of a mechanism driven by el-el
interactions. Those corrections, at firt sight, seem to support Popper’s views
[45] on the progress of science. I have listed criticisms to Popper’s falsification
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theory in ref.[18]. Popper’s views are themselves refuted by the universal accep-
tance„and widespread applications, of the superconductivity theory for simple
superconducting metals.
8 Crucial experiment?
Bacon [44] has introduced the notion of crucial experiment, which allows to
discriminate between a truthful theory and an erroneous one. Duhem [27] has
argued that there is no such thing. I have argued elsewhere [46] that Duhem’s
stand is destroyed by Duhem’s own admittance that “ the theory of vibrating
strings is certain”. The notion of crucial experiment is vindicated by scientific
practice and is intimately connected with the notion of truth, as I discussed in
a previous paper [18].
However, it is striking that, somewhat along some of Cartwright’s ideas [13],
in the case of HTS, various different theories claim they account equally well
– sometimes equally badly – for the same phenomena. Again this cannot be
claimed as an everlasting state of affairs; more rationnally, it seems to point out
that a theory incorporating all aspects of HTS needs to be established. The
search for the “smoking gun”, in the HTS literature, synonymous with “crucial
experiment”, is still going on.
Some experiments have been crucial to discard some theories. None, so far,
has been able to pin point one and only one microscopic mechanism as the single
correct one for HTS.
On the other hand, all theories discussed above have taken into account
experimental features which are experimentally undisputable. What differs from
author to author is the choice of the main objective contradictory features on
which theory is constructed.
It follows from this discussion that a first conclusion confirms, contrary to
Kuhn, Cartwright, Rorty, Latour and others, that the process of knowledge
is simultaneously subjective and objective, and reflects in contradictory social
ways multiple ontological contradictions.
Science has known century long controversies, which have generally ended
up in a qualitatively new theoretical scheme which supersedes previous dis-
agreements, such as for example the debate about discreteness vs continutity
for light. The historical process of research about HTS is by no means ended.
Some now believe that, behind the present state of confusion, astonishing the-
oretical progress on HTS may be lurking around some laboratory corners. Far
reaching consequences on our understanding of nature, far beyond the specifics
of HTS itself are hoped for [21].
9 Dialectics of nature?
I have mentioned above the spontaneous tendency of physicists to think about
natural processes in terms of conflicting scales of parameters and energies. Un-
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der conditions such that one type of energy (or free energy, or thermodynamic
potential) parameter dominates, matter will express its essence through different
phenomenal manifestations: order or disorder, insulator or conductor, ferromag-
netism or paramagnetism, liquid or solid, symmetry or broken symmetry, etc...
Understanding the different relevant scales of lengths, temperatures, magnetic
fields, interactions, at work in the thing etc., is a basic skill of physicists to
analyze nature. In the HTS problem, could it be that one specific aspect of the
physics at hand is that various parameters are simultaneously relevant, while
leading to conflicting types of order? It has been understood after a while that
the primitive dichotomy between the various schools, based on whether Uel−el is
much larger, or much smaller than the band width K is in fact not justified by
quantum chemical calculations. In fact, in the HTS cuprates, Uel−el ≈ K. Un-
der such conditions the role of Uel−ph, and its association/opposition to Uel−el
may be sometimes decisive for certain HTS phenomena. Other phenomena, not
discussed in this paper, such as disorder, or the tendency of electrons to organize
in stripes [21], are believed to be of great importance. The spontaneous breaking
of time inversion symmetry à la Laughlin has not been supported by experiment
in its original version, but may be revived when looking at finer details of elec-
tronic structure. What is at stake here is perhaps the relevance or irrelevance
of a theoretical approach based on a binary contradiction of opposites.
The “pseudo gap” phase seems to be an example where various order param-
eters compete with one another [21, 47]. Sève [1] has discussed the extension of
binary dialectics of nature to richer dialectics based on a multiplicity of poles.
In technical words, the suggestion here is that a number of free energy minima
corresponding to different parameters, broken symmetries, etc., have similar
magnitudes in the relevant temperature ranges, so that correlations within the
material suffer multiple competing influences. This complexity seems also to be
deeply connected with the structural and chemical complexity of doped HTS
cuprates, in contrast with the simple structure of metals of the BCS times. It
may be that exploring this path, in the theoretical physics research, as in the
philosophical one, is a way to a theory and to concepts which might supersede
the present conflicts between the various chapels.
In ref.[18], in the discussion of Quantum Hall Effects (QHE), I have stressed
that the physics of QHE is one where the energy scale Uel−el is much larger
than any kinetic energy scale. In that sense, the QHE physics is the opposite of
simple metal physics, where the kinetic energy scale dominates. The reason for
the lack of a present consensus about the HTS physics seems to be connected to
the intermediate situation, with a complexity calling for qualitatively new theo-
retical concepts, as well as new philosophical developments about the dialectics
of nature.
10 Conclusion
The initial development of the theoretical activity of physicists on the micro-
scopic mechanism of HTS is a rich story involving many aspects of the practice
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and theory of knowledge. I have briefly pointed out some biographical and so-
ciological features, but the main focus in this paper has been on the origins of
present day scientific pluralism. The story of HTS seems a specially well suited
(experimental) ground for philosophical inferences about both the process of
knowledge and those of matter. Universal lessons have been proposed which are
suggested, or confirmed, by this particular example. In particular, the materi-
alist dialectic outlook on the motion of nature, and on the motion of thought
about nature, which has proved its fruitfulness when bipolar contradictions are
clearly at work, seems to need a deepening of its concepts when multipolar
contradictions govern the
I apologize to the many physicists who have contributed significant results
in the field of HTS, whom I have not cited, because of the focus of this paper,
because of my own subjective choices in describing the HTS early history, or
simply because of ignorance.
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